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CASES NOTED
CLASS ACTION: NO AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS
FOR DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs, lakefront owners of property on Lake Champlain, brought
a diversity action in a federal court on behalf of themselves and some
200 similarly situated landowners and lessees for damage to their prop-
erty rights as a result of defendant's alleged pollution of the lake. De-
fendant, a paper company, had purportedly discharged untreated or
inadequately treated waste into the lake, creating a massive sludge blan-
ket which rendered plaintiffs' property unfit for any reasonable use. The
federal district court "with great reluctance" refused to allow the case
to proceed as a class action because the claims of many of the members
of the proposed class failed to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional require-
ment, even though the claims of the named representatives met the mini-
mum amount.' On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held, affirmed: A class action under rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure will not be allowed unless each class member satis-
fies the jurisdictional amount requirement. Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
In Snyder v. Harris,2 it was held that in a class action brought in
federal court, the separate claims of individual class members could not
be aggregated in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.3
The reasoning in Snyder was based on precedent established under the
old rule 23, according to which only the named plaintiffs in a "spurious"
class action were bound by the results.4 After the 1966 amendments to
rule 23, the entire class was bound by the judgment.' In light of this
change, it was hoped that aggregation would be allowed since it could
be reasoned that the amount actually in controversy was the amount
sought by the entire class.6 This view was urged by Justice Fortas in
his dissent to the decision in Snyder.7
1. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971).
2. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
3. Id. In Snyder v. Harris, 393 U.S. 911 (1968), the Court granted certiorari. This was
done to resolve a conflict between the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
which had denied aggregation in Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), and the
Tenth Circuit, which had permitted aggregation in Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831
(10th Cir. 1968). See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
4. Prior to the 1966 amendments, determination of the amount in controversy in a
class action was governed by the conceptual test of whether the claims were "joint," "com-
mon," or "several." If the claims were "common" or "joint" then the class action was "true"
and aggregation was allowed. "Several" claims affecting specific property involved in the
action resulted in a "hybrid" class action. If the claims were "several" but involved common
questions of law or fact, the class action was "spurious." Aggregation was permitted in the
"hybrid" but not in the "spurious" actions. See 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562 (Wright ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3). The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b)(3) binds all members of the class who have not requested exclusion.
6. See generally Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of
Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 601 (1969); Cohn, The New Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204 (1966).
7. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 353 (1969).
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The majority decision in Snyder dashed any hopes of a liberal
interpretation of rule 23 by holding that prior judicial interpretation
of a jurisdictional statute8 could not be modified by the advent of a new
rule.9 In effect, this pronouncement required a reversion to the old
"joint," "common," and "several" classifications in determining juris-
diction, although these classifications were deliberately discarded in the
new rules.'" Professor Wright has expressed his belief that Snyder is not
likely to be overruled, and further expressed fear that Snyder would
be expanded to encompass the situation present in Zahn."
Zahn presented the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with
a novel question apparently left open by the Supreme Court in Snyder.
None of the named plaintiffs in Snyder met the jurisdictional amount
requirement, and the court did not specifically address itself to the situ-
ation where all of the named plaintiffs meet the required amount but
some of the unnamed members of the class do not.
In holding that every member of a class in an action brought under
rule 23 (b) (3) must meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount, the Second
Circuit looked past the intent of the rule, and, as the Supreme Court did
in Snyder, relied on precedent established prior to the adoption of the
amended rule.
Submitted to close scrutiny, the court's reasoning reveals several
weaknesses. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's reliance on
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.12 in the Snyder decision dictated the extension
of the jurisdictional amount requirement to every member of the class.
Yet nowhere in the official report of the Clark decision is there a clear
indication that it was, in fact, a class action.'" In addition, Clark was
decided before the 1966 amendment to rule 23 made the results of an
action under that rule binding on the entire class.
The court indicated that it was "entirely sympathetic" to the prop-
osition that the amended rules should be given a nonrestrictive and lib-
eral interpretation. 4 It cited with approval Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
line, 5 which held that one of the primary functions of a class action
is to provide individuals who have claims too small to justify litigation
a device for vindicating their collective rights. 6 However, after paying
this "lip service" to the proposition of liberal interpretation, the court
stated that the policies underlying the amended rules would not be deter-
minative of the case.
8. The statute there involved was 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
9. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969).
10. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967).
11. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, 316 (2d ed. 1970).
12. 306 U.S. 583 (1938).
13. This fact was admitted by the trial court judge. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53
F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
14. 469 F.2d at 1035.
15. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. Id. at 563. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (1966).
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It was further reasoned that the decision of the court would sup-
port the "congressional purpose" in establishing a jurisdictional amount
in title 28, section 1332, of the United States Code (1970). This con-
gressional purpose was apparently thought to be an attempt to halt the
increase in cases in the federal courts.17 However, the courts have often
relaxed jurisdictional requirements in order to permit a liberal inter-
pretation of the rules. 8 This relaxation has been particularly evident in
the area of ancillary jurisdiction."
The court stated, in further justification of its decision, that the
Advisory Committee did not intend that rule 23(b) (3) ordinarily be
utilized in a mass tort situation.2' This statement is somewhat mislead-
ing. The committee did say that a class action might be inappropriate
in a "mass accident," where questions not only of damages, but of lia-
bility and defenses to liability, would affect the individuals of the class
in different ways.21 However, the committee believed that a class action
would be appropriate where liability could be established in one action,
despite the need for a separate determination of damages.22 It would
seem that Zahn definitely fell within this latter category.
Circuit Judge Timbers, while not addressing himself to each of the
points discussed above, dissented on the ground that the claims of those
members of the class who did not meet the jurisdictional amount require-
ment could have been adjudicated through use of the ill-defined concept
of "ancillary jurisdiction." The judge viewed the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange23 as signaling a move to-
ward liberalized application of ancillary jurisdiction both to promote
judicial economy and to permit resolution of all disputes arising out of
a single cause of action in one proceeding.24 He contended that an ex-
tension of this concept permitting the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs
in the instant action to be adjudicated would be "unquestionably har-
monious" with the current trend of liberalization.2 As mentioned above,
this trend is particularly evident in actions under rule 20,21 where a num-
17. 469 F.2d at 1035.
18. See Brandt v. Olsen, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (N.D. Iowa 1959):
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been recognized
that important provisions relating to the addition of parties would have limited
effect if the same jurisdictional and venue requirements were to be applied in the
case of added parties as to the action between the original parties.
19. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TME LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9 (2d ed.
1970).
20. 469 F.2d at 1036.
21. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966).
22. Id.
23. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
24. 469 F.2d at 1036.
25. Id. at 1037.
26. FED. R. Cv. P. 20.
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they as-
sert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and
if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.
1972]
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ber of recent decisions have allowed parties to be joined even though
their individual claims failed to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount."
The dissent further reasoned that an analogy should be drawn to
the liberal use of "pendent jurisdiction" in cases such as the Supreme
Court decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs."8 In Gibbs the Court
held that a state claim, brought in conjunction with a federal claim over
which the court had jurisdiction, could be adjudicated even though the
federal claim was subsequently dismissed. 9 In the instant case, it could
be argued that the power of the federal court to hear the case attached
when the claims of all of the named representatives of the class met the
jurisdictional requirement. That power could then be extended to permit
adjudication of those claims raised by the remainder of the class which
derived from "a common nucleus of operative fact."' As indicated by
the dissent, implementation of this logical extension would avoid the
"duplicative litigation" promoted by the majority opinion, i.e., the trial
of the claims of the named representatives in the federal district court
and identical actions of other class members in the state courts.8
The instant decision will have the effect of restricting rule 23 (b) (3)
class actions, in at least the Second Circuit, to those rare instances where
every member of the class has a claim in excess of $10,000. Such a re-
striction runs contrary to the underlying purposes of the rule. Indeed,
the trial court, in reaching its decision "with great reluctance," admitted
that "if a construction of rule 23 were controlling, rather than the phrase
'amount in controversy' in the jurisdictional statute, 8 2 its decision would
have been different. A contrary decision would not, of necessity, have
greatly increased the federal workload, since the trial court retains broad
discretion under rule 23 (b) (3) (D) to refuse to permit a class action to
proceed if it appears that difficulties in management would be prohibi-
tive.88 Furthermore, a number of state courts discourage class actions.
4
Therefore, it is conceivable that members of the class denied access to
27. See Eidschun v. Pierce, 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971) ; General Research, Inc.
v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Johns-Mansville
Sales Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. II. 1966).
28. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
29. Id. at 725, where the Court held that
if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial pro-
ceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal
courts to hear the whole.
30. See Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1084 (2d Cir. 1971), holding that the
court had the power to hear pendent claims of class members who did not meet the juris-
dictional requirements but that the court had discretion to dismiss the claims if they proved
to be unmanageable.
31. 469 F.2d at 1039.
32. 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
34. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rosen, 149 Conn. 734, 181 A.2d 592 (1962); Kentucky Dept.
Store, Inc. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 351 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1961); Salitan v. Dashney,
219 Ore. 553, 347 P.2d 974 (1959). But see Judson School v. Wick, -Ariz. -, 494 P.2d 698
(1972); Paley v. Coca Cola Co., 39 Mich. App. 379, 197 N.W.2d 478 (1972).
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the federal courts because of the Zahn decision will never have their day
in court.
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will not approve this further restraint
on the effectiveness of rule 23 as a tool of judicial economy and effi-
ciency.35 Should such an unfortunate result arise, congressional modifica-
tion of the jurisdictional statute appears to be the only available solution.
ROBERT G. FRAME
CONSUMER WAIVER OF DEFENSES UNDER THE UCC
Defendants, husband and wife, purchased a new Dodge automobile
on an installment contract which contained a waiver of defenses against
the dealer's assignee. Three months later the buyers returned the car,
complaining that serious defects had not been corrected although the car
had been brought back for repairs six times. After repossession and sale
of the car, Chrysler Credit Corporation, the assignee of the installment
contract, sued for the deficiency. The purchasers raised the defense of
failure of consideration, and they requested a jury trial on all issues. The
trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings against the purchasers.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held, reversed
and remanded: An assignee of a retail installment sales contract who is
"too closely connected" to the retail merchant to be considered a holder
in good faith, cannot rely on the contract clause whereby the buyer waived
all defenses against the assignee. Rehurefk v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262
So.2d 452 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 267 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1972).
The court's interpretation of section 9-206' of the Uniform Com-
35. On February 20, 1973, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the Second Circuit's decision in Zahn. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 93 S. Ct. 1370
(1973).
1. FLA. STAT. § 679.206(1) (1971):
AGREEMENT NOT TO ASSERT DEFENSES AGAINST ASSIGNEE
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or
lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which
may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under
the chapter on commercial paper (chapter 673). A buyer who as part of one trans-
action signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an
agreement (emphasis supplied).
2. RESTATEMENT or CONTRACTS § 167 (1932):
(1) An assignee's right against the obligor is subject to all limitations of the
obligee's right, to all absolute and temporary defenses thereto, and to all set-offs
and counterclaims of the obligor which would have been available against the
obilgee had there been no assignment, provided that such defenses and set-offs are
based on facts existing at the time of the assignment, or are based on facts arising
thereafter prior to knowledge of the assignment by the obligor.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), an assignee's right against the obligor
19721
